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Civil Ideals, Human Rights and Social Change of the 
East European Post-Socialism 
Tamás Pál 
For the modern East European political thought, Will Kymlicka’s theory of multi-
cultural citizenship (1995) and Charles Taylor’s theory of recognition (1992) have 
been pivotal in constituting liberal multiculturalism as the prevailing site for theoriz-
ing the diversity of cultures. Liberal multiculturalism has firmly situated »culture« in 
the context of relations between dominant groups and minority cultures. The effect 
of this has been significant in locating the discourse of identity/difference in main-
stream political theory. Such a conception of »culture« has contributed to con-
structing and reinstituting cultures as essential objects that are Othered. To develop 
an alternative to dominant liberal multicultural interpretations of »culture«, as an 
initial step, it is helpful to turn to critical anthropology of the transformation be-
cause that approach emphasizes cultural activity rather than culture-as-object. I 
explore the implications of making an analytical shift from »culture of civic politics« 
as bounded object (tradition) to analyzing the »cultural« as contested process, and 
the extent to which this shift creates opportunities to address intersectional identi-
ties and arrangements of power in ways that liberal multiculturalists fail to do. 
»Cultural« in the context of the post- socialist civic society, I argue, moves analysis 
beyond Othered cultures to locating the production of cultural identities and 
cultural relations in contexts of power.  
In Multicultural Citizenship (1995), Kymlicka presents a theory of minority rights 
in order to enhance liberal individual freedom and equality, and also to define the 
limits of minority rights in the context of relations with the liberal state. In Taylor’s, 
»The Politics of Recognition« (1992), he offers a theory of recognition as a sophisti-
cated appeal for the acknowledgment of difference, in which the survival of minor-
ity cultures enables us to be authentic, foster equal dignity, and prevent social frag-
mentation. Whilst Kymlicka appeals to liberal individualists to respond to concerns 
of culture, Taylor employs liberalcommunitarism to situate the importance of 
culture.  
Kymlicka and Taylor employ culture as a code for speaking of ethnic groups, 
historical nations and linguistic minorities, all of which tend to be conflated. For 
Kymlicka culture is a primary good, a resource that provides a context of choice. He 
states that culture »refers to the distinct customs, perspectives or ethos of a group 
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of association«, but then stipulates that he will use »culture« to refer to national and 
ethnic differences in which culture is synonymous with a nation or a people.  
For Taylor, culture exists prior to primary goods, in which cultural survival is a 
vital human need. 
Centrally, culture-as-ethnic/national/linguistic-group is used by Kymlicka and 
Taylor to construct categories of difference. Feminist and post-colonial critic 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak contests that »culture« in multicultural discourses is »a 
nice name for the exoticism of the outsiders« (1999: 355). The unspoken premise of 
both thinkers employs this notion of the outsider so that culture is used only in 
reference to Others.  
The ideological replacement of differentiating Others through »culture« takes 
place without addressing dominant cultural identities. Cultures that are normalized 
(i.e. dominant cultures) form the background of both Kymlicka’s and Taylor’s theo-
ries but receive little analytical attention.  
Taylor argues that although we have to be wary of imposing a homogenizing 
standard based on European industrial societies, there are still some cultures that 
are more advanced than others. The presumption of worth may imagine »a universe 
in which different cultures complement Bach other with quite different kinds of 
contribution« but there are nonetheless some cultures that have a »superiority-in-a-
certain-respect«. 
Furthermore cultures are seen as whole groups that are selfcontained, fixed, 
bounded and coherent even though internally ethno-cultural, national and linguistic 
identities are varied and in a constant state of flux. Kymlicka and Taylor are right 
not to treat cultures as amorphous; however, they underestimate the ways in which 
members of a culture are constituted through intersectional differences that go 
beyond culture-as-ethnic/nation/linguistic Otherness. 
The use of culture-as-ethnic/nation/linguistic-Other inevitably leads liberal 
multiculturalists to present culture through an essentialistic definition, in which it 
becomes an object. An essentialistic definition of culture focuses on the question 
»what is a culture?« by describing its nature. This use of »culture« treats cultural 
groups as if they were bounded entities defined through fixed criteria in which 
members of a culture are homogeneous. This specifically becomes translated into an 
understanding of culture-as-community, which is quite important for our St. Pe-
tersburg discussion using human rights concepts for processing the Otherness in 
sometimes quite fuzzy situations. 
Further, traditional liberal minority politics assumes that societal cultures are 
stable, unchanging and unified, when in fact cultures vary enormously and are not 
necessarily cohesive. It is also the case that not all of the people that belong to a 
particular ethno-cultural minority group will have the same cultural options or pos-
sibilities. Even the importance of language to members of a group will vary and be 
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situational. That approach presupposes that people belong to only one societal 
culture, when indeed people may move in and out of societal cultures or belong to 
many societal cultures simultaneously or change societal cultures at some point in 
their life or only partially participate in cultural practices.  
Taylor makes the claim that it is possible to make judgements about the worth 
of a culture through immersion. This is only possible if a culture is assumed to be 
unified and homogeneous in such a way as to make judgments about it as a whole 
entity. Whilst it is possible to make judgments about certain practices that are just, 
unjust, hierarchical, egalitarian, solidaristic or individualistic, it is problematic to 
make judgments about the totality of a culture. But Taylor essentializes culture and 
as such reduces cultures »within a colonial discourse of tradition and modernity, 
(thus) spatializing these characteristics with a »West and the rest approach«.  
The scope of political theory to interrogate »culture« has been overshadowed by 
the dominance of liberal multicultural interpretations. It is thus necessary to turn to 
disciplines outside of political science that have historically and normatively situated 
culture theory as central. Critical political theorists such as Seyla Benhabib (2002) 
and James Tully (1995) have already begun to look to other subfields. Benhabib 
employs the notion of culture-as-narrative in which the standpoint of the partici-
pant, rather than the observer, is emphasized (2002: 5f.). Tully treats culture as an 
activity in contested terrains, in which »cultures are not internally homogeneous. 
They are continuously contested, imagined and reimagined, transformed and nego-
tiated both by their members and through interaction with each other« (1995: 11).  
An important strand of liberal thinking argues that the moral capacities and 
goods pertinent to citizenship have been underplayed as a result of the deontologi-
cal and procedural biases of liberal philosophy since the 1970s. Two particular ac-
counts of the ethical potential of civil society can be fruitfully distinguished in con-
temporary theorising. These have generated some of the most influential objections 
to the presence of identity politics in democratic civil society. While some of these 
criticisms are more pressing and plausible than others, none is quite as unanswer-
able as their advocates sometimes assume. The objections considered in this paper 
stem from two of the main strands liberal theorising of the last two decades – 
namely democratic associationalism and republican liberalism. The claims and ar-
guments associated with each are not, however, mutually exclusive.  
It has been presented by various critical theorists as a space within which there 
emerges a variety of co-operative ventures, groups and associations. Through the 
notion of a »civil society«, a conditional unity is accorded to the many different 
communities and practices associated with a liberal society. The term is also used to 
convey a sense of the ethical significance of the social space that lies between the 
domain of private, familial life and the institutions of the state. Some liberal plural-
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ists also place instrumental value upon the capacity of civil society to enhance the 
moral dispositions that a democratic society needs.  
Contemporary agents of civil society theorists argue that these kinds of associa-
tions are breeding grounds for such values as reasonableness, a disposition to com-
promise and public spiritedness. These are, in turn, seen as bridges between the 
background culture and political system of liberal democratic states. On this view 
civil society is »a social structure which establishes constraints on the pursuit of 
private interests and provides incentives for individual and collective agents to de-
velop habits of civility«. The idea that there are important moral benefits to be 
gained from such activities as volunteering, social activism and involvement in the 
governance of responsible groups, is central to a body of literature devoted to the 
crisis and renewal of democratic citizenship (Kymlicka/Norman 2000). 
Citizenship as Essentially Contestable 
To take civil, political and social moments first as analytically distinct and then as 
historically successive is already to privilege the analytical rationality defining »politi-
cal/economic man«, and so to disrupt the rhetoric of »stages«.  
The first philosophies of public actions imported after 1989–1991 to the region 
imbued citizenship with a cultural aura and suggested that its civil/capitalist, po-
litical/democratic and social/welfare moments were interfused rather than succes-
sive. That is, he hinted that his civil, political and social moments entailed forms of 
rationality other than the strictly analytical. Despite its promise, however, this shift 
in ordering strategy still left a privileging of »political/economic man.« Thus while 
that approach increasingly queried the individualised »rights« assumed in the first 
tripartite model, it also increasingly approached an individually liberal and formally 
procedural restriction of »citizenship« to the political sphere. »Collective rights«, like 
those at issue in union activity, remained an »anomaly« (cf. the »classical« Marshall 
1950). The problem that the first generation of post-socialist civic activists faced 
and left uncertain, then, was to how to reconcile inclusion of the cultural and collec-
tive effects of citizenship with the individualism in both his analytical privilege and 
his proposed solution.  
Often, a distinction between negative and positive rights is made. Negative 
rights can further be delineated into rights establishing freedom from state or the party 
interference and freedom to do something. Positive rights can include rights to food, 
housing, paid jobs etc. We here propose to distinguish four groups of human rights, 
namely (1) basic human rights, which include the absence of torture, the absence of 
political killings, the absence of people who disappear; they thus reflect freedom 
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from state interference. (2) Economic rights, which include primarily private property 
rights broadly defined. (3) Civil and political rights, which include the unrestricted 
possibility to participate in political life, to travel, not to be censored by the gov-
ernment etc. (4) Social or emancipatory rights, which endow the individual with positive 
rights visá-vis the state.  
Negative rights can be interpreted as creating protected domains that not even 
the state is allowed to trespass. For democratically organized states negative rights 
can thus also be interpreted as a device to protect minorities against current majori-
ties or as »veto rights«, as they give their holders the right to behave in a certain 
way, even if a huge majority would like their holders not to act in that way (Blume-
Voigt 2004). 
From an economic point of view, negative rights can also be interpreted as lim-
iting the scope of possible contracts that are legally enforceable via state institutions. 
This means that basic human rights cannot only prevent the state from doing cer-
tain things, it can also restrict non-state actors in their behaviour. Interpreted like 
this, basic human rights establish limits to the possible extent of private property 
rights that actors cannot even voluntarily renounce from. 
Hayek (1976) takes up this traditional distinction between negative rights that 
create domains protected against trespassing and positive rights that endow their 
holders with a claim against the entire collective.  
Following him some activists believed that positive rights are incompatible with 
a free society, in which individuals determine their own position according to their 
own goals and means, but negative rights like basic human rights and property 
rights are welfare enhancing. 
The interpretation of basic human rights as limits to the possible extent of pri-
vate property rights annoys many orthodox economists of transition because it 
seems to create areas that are exempt from efficiency calculations.  
The enforcement of basic human rights can prevent the realization of efficien-
cies, which means that they can prevent a society from realizing points on the edge 
of the production possibility frontier. Attributing primordial importance to effi-
ciency considerations can also lead one to point out that well-functioning market 
economies need not necessarily be democratic. The prerequisites for a well-func-
tioning market economy were secure property rights. Democracies, however, enable 
majorities to vote in favour of redistribution, which can, at least passed some 
threshold, be interpreted as an attenuation of property rights. Representatives of 
this position thus distinguish between economic rights from civil and political 
rights. However dominant political force tries to avoid declarations like that, from 
the late 1990ies more and more practical political philosophies in the post-soviet 
societies follow this line. 
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Three basic hypotheses with regard to the economic effects of the various kinds of 
rights can be distinguished: The Hayek hypothesis according to which basic human 
rights and property rights (negative rights) have a positive impact on welfare and 
growth, whereas a high degree of social rights (positive rights) would be counter-
productive. The Barro-Posner hypothesis argues that there is an important sequence 
to be observed: first, only property rights are important, they would lead to im-
provements in income which would later allow societies higher levels in the other 
kinds of rights. And the Sen (1999) hypothesis purports that freedom, fairness and 
reciprocity are important and that social capital (which is assumed to encompass 
elements of all four groups of rights distinguished here) has a positive effect on 
welfare and growth, which is, however, not necessarily measured in terms of 
monetary income only (Kimberly-Freeman 2004). 
It is argued here (somewhat following the Sen line of argument) that talk of 
various kinds of human rights makes little sense in the absence of basic human 
rights. The absence of these abuses in some post-Soviet societies is a crucial pre-
condition that must be satisfied before talk of economic rights becomes meaningful. 
This does not only hold for economic rights but also for political and civil rights. 
The absence of the repression of basic human rights has also been called a »virtue 
of omission«.  
New wave of activism does not take the basic rule set of a society for granted 
anymore but try to legitimize or explain it, depending on whether they belong to the 
normative or the positive branch of movements. One argument for justifying basic 
human rights could be that individuals who choose a basic legal framework from 
behind a veil of ignorance are uncertain about their own individual position in the 
future: they might belong to a minority and might not be willing to succumb to the 
will of the majority. Viewed like this, human rights can be interpreted as an insur-
ance against adverse effects on one’s own utility given that one finds oneself to be 
with the minority. Agreement to basic human rights can thus be the result of a 
calculus based on scarcity and opportunity costs. 
A slightly different tack on the issue could stress that people might have a pref-
erence for being treated with respect and decency even if that has economic costs. 
Dworkin’s (1977) talk of »rights as trumps« is often interpreted as an abdication of 
economic calculus in favour of a principles-based approach (Blume-Voigt 2004). 
Embodying the »civic ideal« early debates about »post socialism«, »citizenship« 
has served as a key marker of membership in polities that range from empires 
through nation-states to still uncertainly delineated forms of transnational federal-
ism. The history of debate over its meaning is just as long. »Citizenship« is an es-
sentially contested concept, with its meanings having always emerged in disputed 
and recursive use. Aristotle set this pattern early in his pragmatic solution to the 
problem of defining it: »What effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all 
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others is his participation in giving judgment and in holding office« (Politics 
1275a22). Since this simply shifts the issue to what participation means, and since 
any account of »participation« necessarily implies politico-moral disputes, the fuzzi-
ness remains. Marshall left the question just as open when he defined citizenship as 
»a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community« (1950: 28), for 
while »membership« may be formally or procedurally specified, »community« has all 
the vagueness of both its movement-related and scientific usage.  
The dependence of »citizenship« on myriad forms of »participatiori« and »com-
munity« means that what it is must remain uncertain. A trans-situational analysis is 
still possible, however, through attention to the how of disputes over it. Although 
conceptual order may be a mirage, conceptual ordering is empirically accessible. Pat-
terns emerge in what analysts include and what they omit as they make situational 
sense.  
The first traditional post-1989/91 model of the evolution of civic, political and 
social »rights« has been so extensively canvassed that we do not need to repeat its 
details here. Instead, we move directly to one set of ordering moves in accounts of 
»citizenship«.  
Despite the Aristotelian echo in those definitions, to say »citizenship« in political 
sociology is to say »modernity«. The classical theorists all at least implicitly treated 
modernisation through the extension of citizenship, and their themes recur in all the 
commentaries on and departures from traditional liberalism. These themes arise in 
the familiar and conflicting axioms on »the state of nature« in theorisations of the 
order of modernity: that since human life is by nature solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
and short, social life is possible only if individuality is suppressed in the collectivety 
represented by the Leviathan.  
Those themes, and any number of others, recur in post-socialist accounts of 
citizenship.  
At the same time Adam Ferguson and »civil society« reappear in diagnoses of 
neo-liberalism. Marx appears in Barbalet’s (1988) stress on the tensions between 
citizenship and capitalism, or in Dalton and Kuechler’s (1990) account of social 
movements as collective actors in struggles for inclusion. Toennies hovers nearby in 
Wrong’s (1994) revisiting of the Hobbesian/Parsonian »problem of order«, and so 
of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as modes of belonging. Durkheim resurfaces in 
Lockwood’s (1996) stress on the contradictory dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, 
or in Alexander’s (1997) discussions of citizenship as a civic religion. Weber is 
front-stage in Turner’s (1997) account of citizenship and the city. Blends of those 
classical themes recur in claims that the shifts in the practice and theorisation of 
belonging seen in the turn to »multicultural« or »cultural« citizenship mark a transi-
tion from the modern to the postmodern. 
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The liberal »political man« endowed with »rights« who emerged from the state of 
nature he also invoked the cognate’ economic man in all his rationally calculating 
and utility-maximising glory. This was given to some extent in the context of early 
papers on citizenship.  
Identity Politics 
Liberal associationalists reproduce Tocqueville’s emphasis upon the voluntary char-
acter of group memberships, seeing this as intrinsically morally valuable for a liberal 
society, and beneficial for the democratic character of the population. For other 
associationalists, a more stringent standard needs to be met for groups to be 
»schools of civic virtue«. Identity politics appears to violate both of these condi-
tions, particularly through its propensity to promote the idea that one’s membership 
of certain groups arises from deeply rooted cultural, biological or social processes 
that are beyond the volition of their individual members. Ethnic associations, relig-
ious communities and other groups are more likely to have recourse to arguments 
about social destiny, ascriptively based injustice, cultural duty and the merits of 
identity based affinity in characterising the rationale of membership. Involvement 
with a group on the grounds that one is from a sexual minority group, or because of 
one’s ethnicity, is not in itself a problem for liberals. These groupings are problem-
atic for associationalists in one important further respect. They appear to construct 
group interests in manner that is incompatible with familiar models of liberal plu-
ralism. In their celebration of the variety of interest-based groups that sustain a 
democratic society, pluralists presented individual and collective interests as partial, 
contingent and revisable. Individual participants in such ventures are regarded as 
the self-conscious bearers of coherent, pre-formed interests. A dual characterisation 
of association is typical of liberal pluralism. Groups are seen both as potential con-
duits to democratic character and as vehicles for the promotion of particular inter-
ests.  
Considered against the backdrop of these conceptions of interest-based associa-
tion, the groupings practising the politics of identity appear inherently problematic. 
They are typically regarded as intrinsic to a shared identity that is, in turn, seen as 
affecting the experiences and well being of group members.  
While associationalists remain enchanted by Tocqueville’s notion of groups as 
breeding-grounds for the democratic spirit, some contemporary liberals worry 
about the apparent idealisation of group life promoted by the revival of Tocquevil-
lian ideas. The idea of considering groups as (potential) »schools of democracy« is a 
troubling claim for several different reasons.  
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Though they disagree on many things, liberal advocates of civil society tend to share 
the conviction that civil society is morally separable from, and counter-opposed to, 
the norms governing the spheres in which the state and market are constituted as 
sovereign powers. This perspective sees in the arenas of civil society the sources of 
the virtuous disposition and civic consciousness that are vital for the sustenance of 
a liberal democratic polity. Not all liberal theorists of the modern democratic state, 
however, see the relationship between civil society and civic virtue in this way. As 
Charles Taylor notes in his grand overview of the traditions of western civil society 
theorising, the notion of state and society as organically counter-opposed has been 
continually checked by the idea that the constitution of a democratic society re-
quires the prior achievement of a free state. Republican theorists, in particular, have 
argued for the priority of the constitutional and legal guarantee of freedom from 
arbitrary influence as preconditions for the exercise of individual liberties in the 
context of a civil society. While some forms of republican thought see sub-national 
group commitments and loyalties as intrinsic obstacles to the development of a civic 
consciousness, various theorists have sought to incorporate some of the moral and 
deliberative emphases of the republican tradition within a reformulated liberalism. 
That signals commitments to the principle of individual freedom and conviction 
that a variety of moral beliefs are an ineradicable feature of a free society, in contrast 
to more stringent civic republican ideas about citizenship.  
For these sorts of liberal, identity politics is a worrying threat to democracy both 
because it disrupts the role of civil society as a conduit to democratic virtue, and 
because it hampers the kinds of deliberative practice that the public sphere of a 
democracy requires. Identity based communities, it is suggested, are, overly encom-
passing, in both moral and psychological terms. They make excessive demands 
upon the loyalties and moral energies of their members, and deplete the motivations 
that they need to learn to be citizens. Above all, they undermine the socialisation of 
citizens into dispositions appropriate to democratic deliberation. Such groups tend 
to teach their participants to engage their fellow citizens primarily from the stand-
point of membership of an aggrieved sub-group, rather than as co-equals engaged 
in the kinds of deliberation necessary to develop a sense of the general good of the 
community. 
The discussion so far in this paper has indicated that human rights norms have a 
growing impact on post-socialist politics, particularly towards new social move-
ments. This is largely explicable in instrumental terms – these groups are told to 
comply; conditionality is applied. Compliance is achieved through pressure, incen-
tives or coercive impact. But it is also apparent from the discussion that norms 
matter for non-instrumental reasons. This is much more difficult to explain because 
we must then assume that norms are complied with for other reasons, such as 
rightness, justice or identity. Motivations for political action may thus be rooted in a 
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conviction that something is just and right, and that it should be supported because 
it is »Enlighted« and conforms to modern values and identity. When does an iden-
tity become politically relevant as a preference or an interest, which in turn leads to 
political action? 
Sjursen (2002) suggests there are three types of explanation for political action – 
instrumental, rights-based and value-based, with the latter referring to the specific 
normative context of a political actor. It has been argued that human rights are 
complied with for three reasons or combinations of reasons. They are the same 
ones that apply domestically when we obey the law: coercion, »shaming« or persua-
sion. Abbott et al. (1999: 13) propose, that »a key consequence of legalisation for 
international cooperation lies in its effects on compliance with international obliga-
tions«. Compliance is analysed along three dimensions: delegation, legalization and 
precision. These variables are also useful for formulating hypotheses about the role of 
human rights in the new Post-Soviet politics. 
In comparing public opinion in the New and old Europe then, we see a curious 
set of contrasts. In the post-Soviet societies, many intellectuals and politicians are 
deeply pessimistic about the prospect that sub state national groups can exercise 
territorial autonomy in accordance with liberal-democratic norms, yet are surpris-
ingly optimistic about the possibility that sub state nationalism will simply disappear. 
By contrast, the traditional West-European public opinion is optimistic about the 
capacity of sub state national groups to govern within liberal-democratic con-
straints, but pessimistic about the likelihood that sub state nationalism will disap-
pear as a result of processes of modernization, democratization, development or 
globalization. 
But there is one other very important factor. The trend towards greater accom-
modation of diversity can be blocked or deflected by considerations of security. 
States will not accord greater powers or resources to groups that are perceived as 
disloyal, and therefore a threat to the security of the state.  
Throughout most of the post-socialist and post-Soviet State-minority relations 
have been »securitized«. In the West, by contrast, ethnic politics have been almost 
entirely »desecuritized«. The politics of sub state nationalism in the West is just that 
– normal day-to-day politics. Relations between the state and national minorities 
have been taken out of the »security« box, and put in the »democratic politics« box. 
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Minorities and New Identities Between Human Rights and Social 
Change 
The »securitization« of state-minority relations in Eastern Europe is very real and 
certainly stands in the way of transferring issues such as autonomy from the »secu-
rity« to the »democratic politics« box, along the lines of what has mostly occurred in 
the West. When we put this aspect into perspective, on the one hand, the surface 
manifestation of reluctance by most of the new political class to go down the 
autonomy route for their national minorities largely echoes the underlying suspicion 
of, if not hostility to, cultural diversity imported at the time of collapse of the So-
cialist Ancient Regime from the nominally »culture-blind« values of former and new 
masters, consolidating the stress on national unity (and sovereignty) prompted by 
concerns for internal and international stability. On the other hand, by invoking 
security as a justification for such reluctance, indirectly reaffirms the territorial in-
tegrity of states as the most veritable mantra of inter-state relations.  
In arguing for autonomy and official language rights in Eastern Europe, move-
ments address some of the key concerns which have been voiced in this context, 
namely that 1) community leaders may in fact consist of unaccountable people who 
purportedly mischaracterize the aspirations of the group; 2) minority territorial 
autonomy regimes may reflect a »special status« running counter to equality of 
treatment, and may even prove oppressive vis-á-vis non-minority groups within the 
relevant area; and, even more importantly: 3) they may constitute a threat to the 
cohesion and stability of the country.  
The crisis of identity that we are at present witnessing is not solely coloured by 
the motifs of disenchantment. It also defines the space of emergence for the up-
surge in identities being renewed by the current predicaments of the human condi-
tion. Decentralization suffered by complex societies through the absence of a cen-
tral instance of regulation and self-expression, in which »collective identities are 
subject to oscillations in the flux of interpretations, taking on more the image of a 
fragile network than that of a stable centre of self-reflection«. A new type of struc-
tural change is fragmenting the cultural landscapes of class, gender, ethnicity, race, 
and nationality, which had in the past provided us with solid locales as social indi-
viduals.  
The celebration of weak identities is closely related to the celebration of market 
de-regulation demanded by the neo liberal ideology, which presently steers the 
course of globalization. David Harvey (1989) has relevantly noted the paradox that 
»as spatial barriers become less decisive, the sensitivity of capital towards differences 
in pace grows all the more, increasing the incentive for places to make themselves 
distinct in order to attract capital.« Local identity is thus compelled to transform 
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itself into a marketable representation of difference: it becomes subject to make-
overs, which reinforce its exoticism, and to hybridizations, which neutralize its most 
conflicting features.  
It is to the feminist movement that we owe the production of a radically new 
perspective on identity which, countering all forms of essentialism, affirms the 
divided, decentred nature of the subject while at the same time refusing to accept an 
infinitely fluid and malleable conception of identity (Mouffe 1996). This permits us 
not only to inscribe the »politics of identity« within the political project of human 
emancipation, but also to rethink the very meaning of politics, postulating »the 
creation of a new type of political subject«. This last sentiment recovers for the 
process of identity construction not only those power struggles produced in the 
materiality of social relations, but also those located within the realm of the imagi-
nary. As with the multiplicity of rival identities, the affirmation of a decentred, split 
subject appears not as a theoretical postulate but as the result of an exploration of 
the concrete experience of oppression. 
The last point of our debate centres on the highly problematical relationship 
which today exists between particularism and universalism. The present diversifica-
tion of cultural identities – with no little prompting from postmodernist discourse – 
drives towards the radical exaltation of difference. But, wonders Ernesto Laclau 
(1996: 46), Is particularism conceivable solely as such, leaving aside the differences 
that it affirms? Are the relations between universalism and particularism mutually 
exclusive? 
What multiculturalism demonstrates is that liberal-democratic institutions have 
remained too narrow to welcome a cultural diversity that is tearing apart our socie-
ties for the very reason that it cannot be contained within that institutional struc-
ture. This tearing apart can only be stitched together by a politics that extends uni-
versal rights and values to all those sectors of the population, which have previously 
lived outside the application of those rights.  
It is at this point that the identity debate achieves its maximum tension. In an 
article bordering on a manifesto, Eric Hobsbawm (1996) wonders what identity 
politics has to do with the emancipatory project. Identities today appear more a 
matter of fashion than the colour of your skin. They are interchangeable, chame-
leon-like, and mix-and-match. By contrast, the classic Left was mobilized by »grand 
and universal« causes. Identity politics are, for Hobsbawm, a problem for minori-
ties, and the alliances forged among minorities who cluster around negatively de-
fined identities will always be in danger of disintegrating in the face of the slightest 
internal conflict. From a left-feminist perspective, Chantal Mouffe (1996) identifies 
today’s project of emancipation with a deepening of democracy, the key to which is 
to be found in multiculturalism. It is not only cultural but also political questions 
that are at play in the diversity and conflict of identities: these are today the site and 
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object of political struggles, and, moreover, they shape the primordial terrain in 
which hegemony is exercised. 
As a conclusion an illuminating question is emerging: »What type of relationship 
can be established between identity and otherness that might defuse the danger of 
exclusion?« As a demarcation between an »us« and a »them«, every identity implies 
the temptation to turn the other into an enemy who threatens my own (personal 
and group) identity. Therefore, in order to respond to the question formulated, it is 
necessary to distinguish the political – the dimension of hostility and antagonism 
between human beings – from politics: the construction of an order that organizes 
and facilitates. 
